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On the Predictability of Tax—Rate Changes
ABSTRACT
Some previous analyses have suggested that the smoothing of tax rates
overtime would be a desirable guide for public debt management. One
implication of this viewpoint is that future changes in tax rates would be
unpredictablebased on current information. This proposition is tested by
examining the behavior of U.S. federal and total government tax (and "non—tax")
receipts relative to GNP. The sample for the federal government goes back to
1879, while that for total government starts in 1929. Some econometric
problems with using time—averaged data are discussed. The main empirical
results accord with the theoretical analysis——in particular, there is first,
little indication of drift in the tax rates; second, insignificant relations
of tax—rate changes to the own history of changes; and third, little explana-
tory value for tax—rate changes from a vector of lagged variables, which
include the behavior of government spending and real output. If the findings
are sustained, they impiy that the existing IJ.S. time series data do not
isolate periods in which current overall tax rates would be perceived as
high or low relative to expected future rates. Accordingly, it may be
impossible to use these data to evaluate policies that entail intertemporal
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(716) 275—2669Some previous papers (Burro, 1979, 1980; Kydland and Prescott, 1980)
suggested that the smoothing of t.x rates over time would be a desirable
guide for debt-management policy. For example, the large temporary outlays
by government during wartime would be primarily debt-financed in order to
avoid a substantial excess of wartime tax rates over rates that would be
expected for later years. Similarly, assuming that real government spending
is not strongly procyclical, a countercyclical response of the public debt
allows for smoothing of tax rates over the business cycle.
Heuristically, the case for intertemporaluniformity of tax rates--say,
on factor incomes--emerges if the (own- and cross-) responsiveness of factor
supplies to after-tax rewards is similar at different dates, For example,
the Ramsey-like rule for taxation in inverse relation to own supply elasticities
yields this answer in the context of a uniform intertemporal pattern of
elasticities.1
Departures from uniform taxation over time would be suggested if factor
supply elasticities interact, for example, with the contemporaneous level of
government spending or with the state of the business cycle. The signs or
magnitudes of these effects are not apparent on theoretical grounds--conceivably,
the uniformity of tax rates over time may remain as a satisfactory approximation
to optimal policy. The theory has also not been applied to contexts of uncer-
tainty about future values of government spending, aggregate real income, and
so on,
The basic approach in this paper is first, to adopt the criterion of
constant expected overall tax rates as an approximate guide to optimal public
finance; and second, to regard this proposition as a positive theory about
government behavior. The properties of tax collections over time are—2—
examined empirically to test whether actualbehavior departs significantly
from that dictated by this simple. rule forintertemporal public finance.
A previous empirical investigation(Barro, 1979) considered the impli-
cations of tax smoothing at the level ofthe federal government for the
determination of U.S. public debt. Thepresent analysis looks directly at
the behavior of taxes--specifically,at propositions that concern theunpre-
dictability of changes in future tax rates.
Suppose that Tt represents the (averagemarginal) tax rate applying to
incomes that accrue during periodt.(The restriction to income taxes is
not central to the analysis.) The basichypothesis is that is set in
accordance with a rule that generatesequality between Tt and all expected
future tax rates, as perceived at datet. In particular, constancy of tax
rates emerges if the realizations for all futurevalues of real government
spending, real GNP, and so on, equal theirmean values as conditioned on date t
information.
The level of is determined from the government's intertemporal
budget constraint, taking accowit of tax effects on the scale of economic
activity (that is, on the tax base). Departures of realgovernment spending,
real GNP, etc., from their prior expectationsgenerate revisions in tax rates.
In a simple setting where taxes are proportional to income, the tax rate
change depends on a weighted sum of changes in expected future values of
government spending relative to aggregate income. For present purposes, the
important point is that r is set at each date so that
(1)E(t.JI) = for I =1,2,—3—
applies, where I represents date t information. In other words, tax rates
follow a Martingale process. Alternatively, in first-differenceform, all
future changes in tax rates are unpredictable;
(2) E(Tt+j_Tt+ji)JIt =0forj =1,2,
Equation (2) is the main proposition that is tested in this paper. The full
distribution of tax-rate changes need not be time-invariant in order to
satisfy equations (1) and (2), but the empirical analysis embodies this
additional restriction. In this form tax rates are generated froma random
walk.
The random-walk model for tax rates is reminiscent of similar proposi-
tions for some asset prices, which have been the subject of considerable
empirical investigation. See Fama (1970) for a survey of this area. The
approach is also analogous to the study of consumption that has been carried
out by Hall (1978).
Suppose that real government spending, aside from interest payments,
and real GNP are not themselves generated from random-walkprocesses, In
this case the unpredictability of changes in future values, as shown for tax
rates in equation (2), would not apply for these other variables, The
essence of the tax-rate-smoothing policy implied by equations (1) and (2)
is that any foreseeable behavior for real government spending,2 realGNP,
etc., is incorporated in the setting of the current tax rate, so as to avoid
a pattern whereby tax rates would vary with the predictable changes in the
other variables, Tests for the unpredictability of tax-rate changesare-4-
most interesting in an environment where some future changes in real govern-
ment spending, real GNP, etc., are forecastable. In particular, it would
be less interesting to find that tax-rate shifts were unpredictable if changes
in the government spending-GNP ratio were also unpredictable.Accordingly, the
empirical analysis includes tests in the form of equation (2) for other vari-
ables--notably, for the government spending-GNP ratio--along with the tests
for tax rates. A comparison across the various equations is of substantial
interest from the perspective of assessing the tax-rate-smoothing model.
Empirical Counterparts of Tax Rates
Although average marginal tax rates matter in the theoretical analysis,
data considerations limit the empirical investigation to aggregate average
tax rates. The implicit assumption is the absence of substantial changes
over time in the relation of these average rates to the underlying average
marginal tax rates.
The spirit of the theory pertains to an overall package of taxes at
each date, rather than to individual components. Specifically, the finding
of predictability of tax-rate changes for particular categories of taxation
would not invalidate the central thesis. Therefore, the analysis deals
with the overall tax (and so-called non-tax) receipts for a specified govern-
ment entity. The primary results deal with the U.S. federal government, although
findings are indicated also for the U.S. total governmentsector.3 An attempt
was made to consolidate the Federal Reserve with the federal government by
excluding from receipts the transfers made by the Federal Reserve to the
U.S. Treasury. (Curiously, this item appears under corporate tax liabilities.)


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes to Table 1:
TAXF is total federal government receipts less transfers from the
Federal Reserve, divided by nominal GNP, Before 1929 an
estimate of interest received by the federal government was
also deducted. (The original data included this interest as a
component of revenue.)
GF is total federal expenditures less net interest payments, divided
by nominal GNP. Before 1929 an estimate of gross interest paid
was deducted. (Interest received appears on the receipt side of
the accounts.)
TAXT is total government receipts (intergovernmental transfers are
netted out) less transfers from the Federal Reserve, divided
by nominal GNP. Data were obtained since 1929,
GT is total government expenditures (intergovermental transfers
are netted out) less net interest payments, divided by GNP,
Data were obtained since 1929,
CAS is battle deaths per 1,000 total population, as discussed in
Barro (1981, Table 1),
DYlog (Yi/Yti), where Y is real GNP, 1972 base.
r is the total nominal return over the year for a value-weighted
portfolio of all New York Stock Exchange issues (as compiled by
the University of Chicago's Center for Research on Security
Prices) less an inflation rate. The inflation rate from 1948
to 1979 is log(P/P .3,where is the December value of the
seasona11y-unadjusteaCPI for an urban consumer, exclusive of
shelter, (See n. 7 below,) For 1926-47, the inflation rate is
based on the overall CPI for an urban consumer,
R is the annual average interest rate on 4-6 month maturity prime
Commercial Paper.
H is the annual average of seasonally-adjusted high-poweredmoney
(total currency outside the U.S. Treasury plus reserves of
member banks at the Federal Reserve),
R.H/GNP is the ratio of R•H--the cost per year of holding the stock of
high-powered money--to nominal GNP.
Data since 1929 for government receipts and expenditures, CNP, net
interest payments, and transfers from the Federal Reserve to the U.S.
Treasury are from the National Income and Product Accounts of the U.S.,
1929—74 and issues of U.S. Survey of Current Business.
(continued)—9—
(Notes to Table 1 continued)
Earlier data on federal receipts and expenditures are from Firestone
(1960, Table A-3). Data before 1929 on interest paid and received by the
federal government are from issues of the Annual Report of the Secretary ofthe
Treasury, Washington D.C., U0S Government Printing Office. Federal Reserve
transfers were zero before 1929. Earlier figures for real and nominal GNP
are from Long-Term Economic Growth, 1860-1970, Series Al, A7. Values before
1889 are based on Gallmans data, which were obtained from Anna Schwartz.
CPI data, compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, were obtained
from the Chase Data Bank.
R is from Banking and Monetary Statistics, Banking and Monetary
Statistics 1941-70, and issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
H is from Friedman and Schwartz (1963, Table B-3), Banking and
Monetary Statistics, 1941-1970, and issues of the Federal
Reserve Bulletin.—10—
One interesting issueConcerns the treatment of
inf1ationay finance,
which is excluded in
conventional measures of taxcollectionsThe current
tax rate on holdings of
high_powered (government_issue)money, H, is deter-
mined by a short-term
nominal interest rate, R.The flow, RH,represents
the expected costsper period that are imposedon holders of money. Ina
Perfect_foresight setting, thepresent value of these flows(back to some
"initial" date)corresponds also to thepresent value of governmentrevenue
from money creation.Departures of the actualpresent value of revenues
from this magnitudeare associated with
unexpected capital gains or losses
on cash holdings__see
Phelps (1973, pp. 74-5) andAuernhejmer (1974) for
discussions of this matter.
The implications ofadding the tax on cash
balances to the usual
concepts of taxation are discussed in the
empirical
section__quantitatively the differences inresults are insubstantial.
Appropriate empiricalcounterparts for the overall tax baseare not straight-
forward. Net andgross national product come
imniediately to mind--the latter
concept might be preferable because
reported depreciation islargely arbitrary
from an economicstandpoint and because the
(true) depreciationcomponent of
GNP is potentially
subject to taxation. Inany event tax assessments arenot
necessarily limited to finalproduct or net income-- leviescan be based on
intermediate flows,including governmenta' transferpayments, and on various
stock variables, suchas overall wealth orestates. Some experimentation
indicated that the results
were insensitive to the choiceof tax baseamong
GNP, NNP, or either of these
concepts augmented by governmentaltransfers.
The results discussed
in this paper use GNPas the proxy for the tax base.—11—
Hence, tax rate variables are measured as federal or total government tax
(and nQn-tax) receipts relative to GNP. The hypothesis of unpredictability
for changes in future average marginal tax rates translates empirically into
a proposition of unpredictability for changes in future values of tax receipts
relative to GNP.
The analysis is limited to annual observations on tax receipts. Within-
year data do not seem meaningful because of discrepancies between the time
of tax accrual (which is pertinent for allocative effects) and the
time of payment to the government.
Government expenditure ratios are measured analogously--as either
federal or total annual government spending relative to GNP.The total
government figures exclude intergovernmental transfers. Net interest pay-
ments are determined endogenously, given an initial debt stock, by the
tax/deficit policy in conjunction with the time path of other government
spending. From the standpoint of tax-rate smoothing, the pertinent matter
is the predictability of changes in government spending aside from interest
payments. Therefore, net interest payments have been excluded from the
government expenditure variables. (However, the results are little changed
if this adjustment is not made.) Before 1929 an estimate of federal interest
paid is excluded from spending and an estimate of interest received by the
federal government is deducted from total receipts. See the notes to Table 1
for details.
TimeAggregatioTn Problems
Working (1960) discussed a difficulty in testing random-walk hypotheses
with time-averaged data on commodity or stock prices. The sameproblem arises—12-
in the present context where annualaveirages of tax rates are used.4 If the
random-walk model appUes at some interval that is shorterthan a year (and
which might be infinitesimal), then a random walk wouldnot appear in the
time-averaged annualdata. Suppose, for example, that a positive innovation
to the tax rate (reflecting, say, a change in informationabout future real
government spending) occurs during year t. This change affectsperiod t's
average annual tax rate by less than one-to-one--depending on thetiming of the
informational shift during the year- -but altersexpected future tax rates on
a one-to-one basis. Therefore, future time-averaged taxrates, would
not be related to by a unitary coefficient. In terms of first differences
from one year to the next, the serialindependence of tax-rate changes would
be replaced by a pattern of positive association.
Using first differences of time-averaged observations,Dt
Working's analysis shows--for the case where the interval for thefundamental
random-walk model is infinitesimal and where theunderlying distribution
of the disturbances is time-invariant--that thesimple correlation
between and DE1 equals .25. Note that thesimple correlations of
DTt with earlier lag values remain equal to zero. With the inclusion of
four lagged values, it can be shown (see Appendix I) that the
partial correlations of Dt with each lagged valueare given by (.29, -.08,
.02, -.01). Subsequent partial correlations would benegligible. Generally,
Dt can be written as a moving-average process that involves apattern of
weights on the underlying innovations applicable toperiods t and t-l. For—13—
testing purposes it is convenient to approximate this process in an auto-
regressive form in terms of the time-averaged variables. Assuming normality










This equation replicates the pattern of partial correlations thatwas just
described.
For a case where current information,'islimited to current and
past tax rates, equation (3) suggests that the random-walk model can be tested
via- univariate autoregressions in which the coefficientsare constrained to
equal the hypothesized values. (Note that the constant equals zero--thatis,
a drift in the tax rate violates the underlying theory.)Although this pro-
cedure is carried out empirically, it has theshortcoming of ignoring the
predictive content of other variables, such as realgovernment spending and
real GNP. Unfortunately, simple results fortime-averaged data do not
generally obtain when additional variables are introduced.
Suppose that another variable, X, is added to the analysis. Assume that
this variable is generated also from an underlying random-walkprocess. It
is assumed here that the innovations to r and Xare bi-variate normal. The
X-variable is potentially of interest if its innovationsare correlated con-
temporaneously with those of t--denote this correlation by the fixedparameter,
p. The other parameters of the distributions are also treated as time-invariant.
In the absence of time-averaging, the latest observed taxrate, t,wouldstill
define the mean value for all future rates--values of Xup to X would be-14-
irrelevant here, despite the condition,p0. However, when -r is observed
only in time-averaged form, the observations on X can become pertinent--
essentially, this variable may help to pin down the latest value of the
fundamental r series, given that only-r. is observed. Aside from the
situation where p =0,a case where the observation on X is not helpful
arises when this variable is observed in the same type of time-averaged
form as that applying to -r.In this case equation (3) continues to apply--in
particular, the coefficients on all lagged values of first differences of the
time-averaged X variable, D)(t1, equal zero. (See Appendix I.)
The results change if the X-variable--still generated from an underlying
random-walk process--is observed directly, rather than in time-averaged form.
(For example, if stock prices plus accumulated dividends are generated from
a random walk (with drift), but X represents the full return on equity over
the year or the end-of-year stock price, rather than the annual average of
stock prices.) For the case where D1 and DXt1 are the only included
right-side variables, it is shown in Appendix I that the regression coef-
ficient of Dt on DX1 has the same sign as the underlying contemporaneous
correlation, p. The coefficient on Dti is reduced below .25 when p0—-
further, the coefficient becomes negative ifissufficiently large.5
The analysis becomes more complicated if the movements in the X-variable
are themselves serially correlated. Note that, unlike for tax rates, the
theory does not suggest any special form for the X-process--therefore, the
random-walk case cannot generally be assumed. In any event the model no
longer implies either that variables like DXt would be irrelevant for—15—
in the form of equation (3) or that the coefficients o the DTt
variables would equal those shown in the equation.
Suppose that all variables dated t-l, as well as t, are excluded on the
right side of an equation for DTt. Despite the presence of time-averaging,
the regression coefficients of all right-side variables in this form--which
are dated up to t-2--would be zero. Thus, .,., and all variables,
DX2, ..., would be irrelevant for DTt. Therefore, tests for the unpredict-
ability of tax-rate changes can be carried Out in this form in a multivariate
setting.
With the tax rate change, DT, examined only in relation to variables that
are dated two or more years previously, there are questions about the power
of statistical tests. The comparison with parallel relationships for real
government spending and other variables is important in this respect--that is,
the presence of predictive power in these other equations would suggest that
the tests for tax-rate changes were meaningful. Also, the presence of drift
in the tax rate--that is, a test for a nonzero constant in the Drt equation--is
not sensitive to the exclusion of date t-lexplanatoryvariables. Despite ques-
tions about statistical power in annual equations with first lags omitted, it
is unclear how else to proceed in the multivariate case, The possibility for
a direct analysis--as shown inequation (3) for the univariate setting--depends
strongly on the detailed statistical properties of the additional variables,
X, which are not the focus of the theory. Further, with respect to aggregate
tax rates, it does not seem feasible to use data at an interval finer than
one year.-16-
Drift in the Tax and Spending Ratios
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficientsand standard errors for
equations that include only the constant term. For thefederal government,
the rariable is either the change in the ratio offederal tax
receipts to GNP, D(TAXF)t(TAXF) -(TAXF)ti,or the change in the
ratio of federal spending to GNP,D(GF)t EGF
-
GFt1.The periods con-
sidered are 1884-1979, 1884-1929,1930-1979, and 1948-1979. Data and
definitions of variables appear in Table 1.Graphs of the tax and spending
ratios are shown in Figure 1.
The estimated constants correspond, ofcourse, to the means of the depen-
dent variables over each sample. Since thefederal tax and spending ratios
rose over all samples that are considered, the estimatedconstants in the
first-difference specification__that is, theestimated drift for each ratio
in level form--are all positive.However, the point estimates are very
close to zero for the 1884-1929period. Over all samples considered, the
estimated constants differ insignificantly formzero at the 5% level,
although significance would have been attained insome cases if a less
stringent critical value had been adopted.
Over the longer samples--1884_1979or l930-1979--the point estimates of
drift coefficients for the tax andspending ratios are very close. However,
the substantially greater sample variance forthe spending ratio (which is
discussed further in a later section)implies that the estimated drift coef-
ficients for this variable do not differsignificantly from zero. For the
federal tax ratio, the estimated driftcoefficient for the 1884-1979 sample—17—
Table 2
Estimated Drift Coefficients and Sample Standard Deviations








Notes:Dependent variables are the first differences o tx nd spending
ratios, as defined in Table 1. The 5% critical level is 2.0 for
the t-ratios that are shown for the estimated drift coefficients.
For the sample standard deviations, the F-ratios are thesquare
of the value for spending divided by that for taxes.(These
values are appropriate if the innovations to taxes andspending
are independent.) 5% critical values for the hypothesis of equal
variances are noted in parentheses.
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is .0019,s.e.=.0012(t =1.6),while that for 1930-1979 is .0034,
s.e. =.0020(t =1.7).For the post-World War II period (1948-1979),
the situation is reversed--the spending variable exhibits a larger estimated
coefficient and t-ratio than the corresponding tax variable. For the federal
spending ratio, the estimated drift coefficient is .0027, s.e. =.0024
(t =1.1),while that for the tax ratio is .0007, s.e, =0019(t =0.3).
When the total government sector is substituted for the federal govern-
ment, there is a greater indication of drift in the spending and tax ratios.
(See Pigure 2--note that data have been obtained for total government variables
only since 1929.) The estimated coefficient for tax-rate changes over the 1930-79
sample, .0043, s.e. =.0017,is significant at the 5% level. The point esti-
mate for changes in the spending ratio, .0043, is the same, but the standard
error, .0065, greatly exceeds that for tax-rate changes. Estimated drift
coefficients for l948-79--.0044, s,e. =.0026for spending and .0024,
s.e. .0017 for taxes--are higher than those found for the federal govern-
:aent, but again insignificantly different from zero at the 5% level.
Except for some weak indication from the post-World War II sample, the
results do not support the view that a drift in the government spending
ratio over some period would be smoothed out (through the use of debt policy)
and not appear in the tax ratio. On the other hand, the findings for the
federal government are consistent--at conventional significance levels--with
the absence of drift in both spending and tax ratios. The historical rise
in these ratios, as shown in Figure 1, is not necessarily an indication of

































































































































































































































































period, there is only a weak indication of drift. Restrictions
on constant terms are reconsidered below asparts of joint hypotheses
with other coefficients.
Results from Univariate Autoregressions
Table 3 reports results for OLS regressions that includea constant
and four annual lags of the dependent variable. The form ofthese equations
is




where Z represents either TAXF or GF. Thesample periods and dependent vari-
ables coincide with those just discussed. Theregressions were run also with
first lags deleted and with the coefficients of the fourlags constrained to
equal those shown in equation (3). For each sample and choice ofdependent
variable, Table 3 reports the following:
1) the F-ratio for the hypothesis that the coefficients of thefour





2) the F-ratio when the hypothesis of a zeroconstant, =0,is added;
3) the unrestricted point estimate and standard error for the firstlag
coefficient, ct1 (the full regression results are shown in appendix TableAl);
4) for the case where the first lag of the dependent variable isomitted,




the constant first unrestricted and then set tozero; and—22—
5) F-ratios for the hypothesis shown in equation (3),c =.29,
-.08, =.02,c4 =-.01,with the constant first unrestricted and
then set to zero.
From the perspective of testing the random—walk model withtime-averaged
data, the F-ratios listed under (5) are of most interest. Those listed under
(4) also constitute a valid test of the theory. The constraints
shown under (1) and (2) are not implications of theunderlying random-walk
model.
With the change in the federal spending ratio, D(GF), used as thedependent
variable and for the longer samples, 1884-1979 and 1930-1979, thehypothesis
from equation (3),c1 =.29,2 =-.08,c3.02, c4 =-,Ol, is rejected at
the 5% level. With the constant unrestricted and 5% critical values shown
in parentheses, the results are F1 =3.9(2.5) for the 1884-1979 period
and F5 =2.7(2.6) for the 1930-79 sample. With the constant set to zero,
the corresponding results are F1 3.1 (2.3) and F5 =2.2(2.4). The last
statistic is just below the 5% critical level. Overall, there is indication
from the longer samples that the past history ofchanges in the federal
spending ratio has some predictive power for future changes. Over the
1948-79 sample, the random-walk hypothesis would beaccepted for the federal
spending ratio--the result is F7 =1.3(2.7) with the constant unrestricted
and F7 =1.2(2.6) with the constant set to zero.
For the tax-rate change, D(TAXF), the random-walk model from
equation (3) is accepted over all samples. With the constant unrestricted,
the hypothesis,a1 =.29,a2 =- .08,a3 =.02,a4 =-.01,corresponds—23—
to statistics of F1 =1.3(2.5) for the 1884-1979 sample, F5= 0.8 (2.6)
for the 1930-79 period, and F271.7 (2.7) for the 1948-79 sample. With
a zero constant included in the null hypothesis, the corresponding
statistics are F1 =1.4(2.3), F5 =1.0(2.4), and F7 1.4 (2.6),
In all cases one accepts the hypothesis that the past history of changes in
the federal tax-GNP ratio has no predictive value for subsequent changes.
The results of another valid test of the random-walk model--c2 =
ct3
=
= 0,with the first lag value omitted--are shown also in Table 3. The
conclusions correspond to those just discussed--rejection for the D(GF) vari-
able over the 1884-1979 and 1930-79 samples, but acceptance for D(GF) over
the 1948-79 period and for the D(TAXF) variable over all samples,
It may be worth noting the pattern of estimated coefficients for the
1948-79 sample when D(TAXF) is the dependent variable. As indicated in
Table Al of the appendix for the case where the first lag of D(TAXF) is
omitted, these estimates and standard errors are -.37(.17) for D(TAXF)t2,
-.22(.17) for D(TAXF)tand -.20(.17) for D(TAXF)t4. This pattern of
negative coefficients on past tax-rate changes would be predicted by a
model that specified a target level of tax rates. In this case, shifts
in tax rates would tend to be reversed later. Although the pattern of
estimated coefficients is suggestive of this mechanism, the insignificant
F-values imply that the post-World War II data are also consistent with
the random-walk model for tax rates. The F-values for the case where the
first lag of D(TAXF) is deleted are (from Table 3) F8 =2.2(5% critical
value =3.0)with the constant unrestricted and F8 =1.7(2.7)with the


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































=0.The F-values for the D(GF) variable over the longer
samples are substantially greater than before--for example, F1 =9.3applies
to the 1884-1979 period when the constant is unrestricted. The statistics
for the D(TAXF) variable remain below the 5% critical levels, although the
F-values obtained from the 1884-1979 sample are larger than those found in
tests of the other hypotheses. In any event the previous discussion demon-






=0is not an implication of the underlying
random-walk model.
Overall, the evidence from the longer samples supports the idea that tax
rates are set so as to smooth out predictable movements in federal spending
relative to GNP. The significant F-values for the D(GF) variable in tests
of equation (3) indicate that some smoothable variations in the federal
spending ratio have been isolated. For the 1948-79 period, the lack of
predictive power from the ownpasthistory is accepted for both the tax and
spending ratios. This finding is consistent with the underlying theory--how-
ever, the results are less interesting in that no smoothable movements in
D(GF) were detected.
The results for the total government sector (for 1934-79 and 1948-79
samples) are basically similar to those just described. The main difference
is that the F-value for the case of the spending ratio over the 1934-79sample
is somewhat smaller than that found for the federalspending ratio over the
1930—79 period.-26—
Results from Vector Autoregressions
The variables selected for vectorautoregressions were those that seemed
promising, piori, as predictors for tax-ratechanges. The two types of
variables considered were those thatpertained to the evolution of government
spending and those that related toaggregate output fluctuations.6 The ratio
of federal spending to GNP,as discussed before, is one of the included
variables. A measure of the persistence
of these expenditure changes is
likely to be important for tax ratedetermination--in particular, tax rates
should respond strongly andcontemporaneously to spending changes that are
viewed as largely permanent. Someprevious analysis (Barro, 1981) isolated
a war-intensity variable as a good indicatorof the temporary nature of
the accompanying changes in defensespending. This variable, which is
defined for war years as the
concurrent u.s. casualty rate (CAS), is included
in the vector autoregressions.(See Table 1 for a definition andtabulation.)
I have not found any other variablesthat signal the duration of changes in
government spending.
The growth rate of real GNP, DY, is includedas a business cycle-type
variable. The real rate of return onequity, r,7 has also been used, pri-
marily because it functions as a good predictor forsubsequent values of DY.
Together, the DY and r variables provide some predictive valuefor subse-
quent growth rates of output. Therefore, these variables wouldbe likely
to pick up any systematic "cyclical"patterns in tax rates. See Table 1
for a listing of the DY and r variables.
I have not attempted to includeany political variables, such as the
proclamation of a tax "surcharge" for 1968, theannouncement of a "one-time tax
rebate" for 1975, or Reagan's promiseduring 1980 to cut tax rates for 1981—27—
and later years. The issue is whether these pronouncements have any informa-
tion content--holding fixed the other included variables--for subsequent
changes in overall tax rates. It is unclear how to quantify these types of
announcement variables over the full sample in order to test for their
predictive value.
Four annual lags of each variable have been included in the vector
autoregressions. The previous discussion of time-averaging indicates the
difficulty in interpretation for first-lag values. As mentioned, the random-
walk model does not generally predict own-lag coefficients as shown in
equation (3) or zero values for the coefficients of other variables. Since
coefficient hypotheses in representations that include first-lag values are
sensitive to the detailed specification for all variables--on which the
theory provides no guidance- -itseems best to focus on settings in which
the first lags are omitted. For this case, with the tax-rate change as
the dependent variable, the random-walk model predicts zero coefficients for
all independent variables. Clearly, the interest in these tests is heightened
if some predictive power remains for changes in the federal spending ratio
and output growth, even when all first lags are eliminated.
Results are presented for 1930-79 and 1948-79 samples.(The r variable
was unavailable before 1926, although some satisfactory approximations can
probably be generated from available stock price indices and dividend data.
Since the quality of real GNP data also deteriorate before 1929, it may not
pay to extend the sample much before 1930,)—28—
The format of Tables 4-7 is as follows:
1) The presence or absence of first-lag variables and the sample period
are indicated.
2) The dependent variable for each regression is shown in the first
column.
3) F—statistics and 5% critical values are shown for the hypothesis that
the coefficients of all lagged variables are zero--for the case of the D(TAXF)
and D(GF) variables, the F-ratio is shown also when the hypothesis of a zero
constant is added.
4) F-values are indicated for the hypothesis of zero values for all
lags of one variable--D(TAXF), D(GF), GAS, DY, or r--with no restrictions
imposed on the coefficients of the other variables; the full regression
results with D(TAXF) and D(GF) as dependent vai'iables are shown in Table A2
of the appendix.
Consider first the results for the 1930-79 sample when first lags of
all variables are excluded (Table 4). For the federal tax-rate change,
D(TAXF) in line 1, the hypothesis that all lagged coefficients equal zero
corresponds to a statistic, F 1.3 (5% critical value =2.0)when the
constant is unrestricted, and F =1.4(2,0) with the constant set to zero.
Therefore, the hypothesis is accepted that tax—rate changes, D(TAXF)t
(TAXFt -TAXFt1),
are unpredictable, based on the information contained in
lagged values up to date t-2 for the five variables considered.The F-values
are also below the 5% critical level for each variable considered separately.
The largest value, F =2.6(2.9), arises for the lags of the equity return,
r.-29-
A parallel hypothesis for changes in the federal spending ratio,
D(GF)t
in line 2, is rejected. The hypothesis of zero coefficients for lagged
values up to date t-2 corresponds to a statistic, F =4.2(2.0), when the
constant is unrestricted, and F 4.4 (20) with the constant set to zero.
The individual F-values indicate separate significance only for the lags of
the wartime intensity variable, GAS, where the statistic isF4 =6.2(2.9).
This result reflects the predictable effect of war on subsequent changes in
federal spending (which is negative, because of the temporary nature of war8).
The insignificance of the GAS variable in the D(TAXF) equation indicates
that this predictable influence on spending does not carry over to a fore-
seeable movement in tax rates. Deficit spending during wars allows for
the smoothing of tax rates.
The distinction between spending and tax behavior does not hinge entirely
on the war variable. With the lags of the GAS variable deleted, the lags of
the remaining four variables are jointly significant for D(GF)--the statistic
• 12 • • •• • • is
F372.8 (2.0). These variables re still jointly insgnficant for
D(TAXF), where the statistic is F =1.3.
The results for output growth, DY in line 4 of Table 4, indicate some
explanatory power even with first lags of all variables omitted. The statistic
for zero coefficients on all lagged variables (with no restriction on the con-
stant) is F =•2.4(2.0). For individual variables, there is significance
for the lags of DY, r and GAS--the respective statistics for F4 (5% critical
value =2,9)are 4.3, 4.1 and 4,0. Therefore, the equation for tax-rate
changes could have picked up a systematic response to business fluctuations--
that is, to the expectation that output was currently high or low relativeto tmnormalt (with allowance for drift inthe level of output). Tothis
extent, the findings rule out an important cyclicalpattern of the federal
tax-GNP ratio,9
The independent variablesare jointly significant when GAS isused
as the dependent variable (F15.2 (2.0) in line 3 of the table).1°
The main role is played by the lags of GASand D(GF) (F4 =23,8(2.9)
22.6, respectively). The variables consideredlack explanatorypower
future values of the real rate of return onequity, r (line 5).
Table 5 contains regression results in thesame form for the 1948-79
sample. The conclusions on the tax-rate variable,D(TAXF) in line 1, are
simLar to those just described. Thatis, the hypothesis of unpredictability
for tax-rate changes is againaccepted. However, significant predictive
power no longer obtains for future changes in the federalspending ratio--the
statistics (line 2) are F =1.9(2.4) with the constant unrestricted and
2.1 (1.9) with the constant set to.zero. Thesestatistics are just below
the 5% critical values. The individual F-valuesindicate that the most
important change from the previous results is the loss inpredictive power
for the lags of the CAS variable. This
the World War II years from the sample.
variations in the federal spending ratio
predictability for tax-rate changes over
strong support for the theory.
The equation for output growth (line 4 of Table5) also indicates
lack of explanatory power over the 1948-79sample, as indicated by the
statistic, F =0.6(2.4). With lagged values incorporated onlyup to




change reflects the elimination of
In any case, since no smoothable
were isolated, the absence of







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































subsequent output growth would be expected todepart from the normal drift,,
In this sense the results also would
not detect predictable tax-rate changes
that were associated withanticipated movements in output.
Finally, the results over the 1948-79period do reveal some explanatory
power for future values of the war-intensity
variable, GAS (line 3), but
none for r (line 5).
Results that include the first lags of allvariables are shown in
Table 6 for the 1930-79 period and inTable 7 for the 1948-79 period. The
addition of first lags raises the F-ratiosover both samples when the
dependent variable is D(TAXF), D(GF) or DY.11For the 1930-79 period,
the statistics for the D(TAXF) variableare now F =2.5(1.9) with no
restriction on the constant, and F =2.6(1.9) with the constant set to
zero. Comparable results for the D(GF) variable are F =9.7(1.9) and
F =9.3(1.9). For the DY variable, the result (with no constraint on
the constant) is F =10.2(1.9). The individual statistics indicate the
separate significance of CAS and D(GF) for the D(TAXF) variable; of GAS
and D(TAXF) for the D(GF) variable; and of r, GAS and DY for the DY
variable.
If the time-averaging problem had been ignored, theseresults would have
indicated substantial predictivepower from the included independent variables
for future changes in the federal spending ratio andoutput. The explanatory
power would have been viewed as much reduced, but still significant, for










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































time-averaging of data--in conjunctjon with
some contemporaneous correlation
of tax-rate changes with theD(GF) or other variables__couldaccount for the
apparent predictability of tax-ratechanges when first lags of variablesare
introduced. (The results withD(GF) and DY as dependent variables wouldalso
be affected.) Similar observationsapply to the results for the 1948-79
period with first lags of variablesincluded, as shown in Table 7, (However,
with D(TAXF) or D(GF) as thedependent variable, the F-statisticsare now
just below the 5% critical values.)
Inclusion of the Tax on Cash Balances
The analysis has been redone withtaxes defined to include the infla-
tion tax on holdings of high-powered money,12
This levy was measured as R.H,
where R is the annualaverage of the 4- to 6-month commercialpaper rate and
H is the annual
average of high-powered money (totalcurrency outside the U.S.
Treasury plus reserves held by commercialbanks at the Federal Reserve)The
values of R•H are shown relativeto nominal GNP in Table 1,,
Quantitatively,
the inclusion of this taxcomponent has a small impact on calculatedoverall
tax rates, with the largest effectsin terms of percentage points
occurring
since the rise in interest rates inthe late 1960s,'3 Forexample, the
federal tax rate is raised in 1969
form .207 to .214, in 1974 from .200to
.208, and in 1979 from .206 to .213,
This change in the definition oftax rates does not alter thegeneral
nature of the results that have beenreported earlier. In terms of Tables
4-7, the main change is a small reductionin the F-values when D(TAXF) is





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Results with Total Taxes and Spending
The conclusions from the vector autoregressions are not greatly modified
if federal taxes and spending are replaced by total government measures.
Because of data limitations, the 1930-79 sample is now replaced by 1934-79.
The findings for 1934-79 show first, no predictability for changesin
tax rates when first lags of variables are excluded (F =1.5);second,
significant explanatory power in this setting for changes in total spending
relative to GNP (F =4.6);third, significance for tax-rate changes when
first lags are included (F =2.9);and fourth, a much larger F-value in this
case or changes in the spending ratio (F 8.1). The results over
the 1948-79 sample are also similar to those discussed previously for the
federal government.
The Volatility of Tax and Spending Ratios
The underlying theory implies that tax-rate movements would smooth out
predictable variations in the ratio of government spending to income. In
this respect the model is reminiscent of interest-rate term-structure models,
where the long rate is supposed to smooth out predictable movements in short
rates. Shiller (1979, 1980) has used such models to generate propositions
that concern the relative volatility of variables--for example, the variance
of changes in long-term interest rates should be smaller than that of short
rates, The parallel proposition here would be an excess of the variance of
changes in spending ratios over that for changes in tax rates.
The sample standard deviations (about sample means), G,forchanges in
spending and tax ratios are shown over various periods in Table 2. The—38—
-va1ues are higher for thespending ratios in all cases. For the 1884-1979
sample, the results areGD(GF) =.0402and°D(TAXF) =.0116.Over the 1930-79
sample, the comparable values are .0487 and .0140. When totalgovernment
measures are used, the results over the 1930-79 periodare .0461 versus .0120.
For the 1948-79 period, the spending ratiosare far more stable and the
differences in s-values are less dramatic. The valuesare .0134 for D(GF)
and .0106 for D(TAXF). Corresponding figures fortotal government are .0145
and .0097.
The greater volatility in spending ratios than intax ratios supports
the underlying view of tax-smoothing.However, it is clear that a smaller
Variance for changes in tax ratios than forchanges in spending ratios does
not, per se, rule out a pattern of predictable movements in taxrates. There-
fore, the volatility tests should be viewed assupplementary to the tests that
have been carried out earlier.
Concluding Observations
The present evidence is generally supportive of thetax-rate smoothing
model of intertemporal public finance. Validtests of the random-walk model
for aggregate federal and totalgovernment tax rates led to acceptance at
conventional significance levels.14 In somecases parallel hypotheses for
the ratio of government spending to GNP and foroutput were rejected. There-
fore, the analytical procedure was capable ofdetecting systematic movements
of tax rates that mimicked predictablechanges in government spending and
aggregate output. The volatility tests for taxes versusgovernment spending
were also consistent with the tax-rate-smoothingviewpoint.—39—
Given the limitation to annual data and thenecessity of deleting first
lags in the vector autoregressions, the approachcan miss predictable patterns
in overall tax rates that apply to short timeintervals. For example, if a
change occurs that would induce a permanent shift in taxrates, but adjustment-
cost considerations dictate postponing the effective date fortax law changes
until the following calendar year, then tax rates would beperceived for some
portion of a year as high or low relative to expectedlong-run values. The
tests that delete first-lag values would notpick up this relationship.
However, the results from the univariate autoregressions do ruleout simple,
statistically significant patterns of association for overall tax-rate
changes from one year to the next.
From the viewpoint of intertemporal substitution effects, the important
relation concerns current tax rates relative to anticipated future rates.
For example, an expectation of rising tax rates on labor earnings would
generate a positive substitution effect on current labor supply. Similarly,
anticipations about future changes in the investment tax credit have been
emphasized as a source of intertemporal substitution effects on investment
demand (Kydland and Prescott, 1977, pp. 482-86). The present techniques and
explanatory variables were incapable of identifying situations where current
overall tax rates for the federal or total government sector were temporarily
significantly above or below their long-run expected values. If this finding
is sustained in more general circumstances, it suggests that existing aggre-
gate time series observations will not be useful in assessing how responsive—40-
the economy would be to overall taxes that are perceived as temporarily
high or low. The necessary experiment seems not to have been carried Out.
Policies that involve intertemporal manipulation of aggregate tax rates
probably cannot be evaluated with the available data,—41-
Footnotes
1Atkinson and Stiglitz(1980, Chapter 12) discuss the limitations
of the analysis that focuses on own-elasticities.They also present
some more general treatments of the optimal tax problem. Conditionsfor
the optimality of uniform taxation are presented in Sandmo(1974) and
Sadka (1977), The difficulty in using these results arisesin assessing
the quantitative significance of deviations from theprecise conditions
for ensuring that uniform taxation isoptimal.
2The theoryapplies to government spending net of interestpayments.
The interest payments are determined from the initialdebt and the time
path of deficits, given the time path of interest rates,
3Mobility across governmentaljurisdictions may limit the possibilities
for a tax-rate-smoothing debt policy--seeBenjamin and Kochin (1978), There-
fore, the model may fit better for the federalgovernment than for state and
local governments, However, the federalgovernment can set a debt policy to
smooth total tax rates, rather than federal rates, In thiscase, the model
would apply to total government tax rates.
4
It also affects Hall's (1978) analysis ofconsumption, although the
problem was not considered there.
5A negative coefficient forDti arises if Ipi >v'7. Thecoefficient
cannot fall below -1/5, which is attained when Ipi= 1,
6i examined alsolagged values of public debt expressed relative to
GNP. These variables were unimportant forexplaining changes in the tax
and spending ratios,-42--
7The dollar rate of return for eachyear is the value-weighted total
return for all New York Stock Exchange issues, as compiled by theUniversity
of Chicagots Center for Research on Security Prices. An inflationrate is
subtracted to determine the real rate of return. From 1948 to 1979 the
inflation rate is calculated from the seasonally-unadjusted December value
of the consumer price index for an urbanconsumer, measured exclusive of
the shelter component. (Shelter was deleted in order to avoid theerroneous
measures of mortgage interest costs. For the 1967-79 period, where the CPI net
of mortgage interest costs is available, therewas a close correspondence
between the inflation rate measured net of shelter and that measurednet
only of mortgage interest costs.) Before 1948 the overall CPI for an urban
consumer was used.
The estimatedcoefficient ofCASt2 in the equation for D(GF) is
-.23, s.e, =.05.See Table A2.
9My previous resultson the cyclical behavior of public debt(Barro,
1979, pp. 963, ff.) were based on therelation of current real GNP to
an estimated time trend. Thatanalysis should be revised to utilize a
measure of current real GNP relative topredicted future values. The
temporary federal spending variable from thatanalysis should be similarly
recomputed.
10Since CAS >0applies, the linear specification for this variable
is inappropriate. However, theonly purpose of this equation is to indicate
the significant explanatory value ofthe lagged variables.-43-.
11The F-value for GAS remainssignificant, while that for r is again
insignificant.
12GNP wa retained as the taxbase, although the inclusion of "monetary
services" would be a possibility.
13The proportionate effects aregreater in some earlier periods--for
example, in 1929, where R =.058applies, the federal tax rate is revised
upward from .0368 to .0408.
14The one exception is thesignificant drift for the total government
tax ratio over the 1930-79 period.-44-
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Appendix
I
Analysis of the Time-Aggregati,on Problem
Suppose that observations correspond to "years" as numbered by
t1, 2, ...Eachyear is composed of underlying segments, i =1,2, ..,n.
The basic model dictates a random walk fora variable t at these underlying
time units:
(Al) T.T +U., ti t,i-4 ti
for all t and i =1,...n,where TtO 'r1. The disturbance is i.i.d.
with zero mean. The distribution ofu is assumed to be normal in some of the
discussion.
The time-averaged observation for period t is
(A2) n1ti








That is, is a moving-average process, involving disturbancesapplicable to
years t and t-l.
From equation (A3) it follows (as in Working (1960)) that the simple
correlation between DT and Dt is
t t-l
C0V(D (n2-l)








It follows from inspection of equation (A3) that the simple correlation of
Dt with DTt., where i >2,is zero With DTt1 omitted, DTt is
independent of the set of lagged variables, DTt2 Drt3,
Equation (A3) can be used also to evaluate a string of partial
correlations involving DT and a set of lagged values where i =1,2,
With four lags included, the pattern of partial correlations turns out
to be 56/193 (.29), —15/193 (—.08), 4/193 (.02), and —2/193 (—.01).





The underlying interval length, as determined by n, coincides with that for
t,Thedisturbances, (u±, Vt1), are now treated as bivariate normal with
zero mean, serial independence and contemporaneous correlation p.
It can be shown that the partial correlation of DTt with DXt1,. given
is zero. Similarly, given the string of lagged values,DTt1, the partial
correlation of Dt with DXt. is zero.
Suppose now that X is observed directly, rather than intime-averaged
form. The first difference is then
(A7)DX =v
t t,l t,n-A3-
Given that v±) ae biyarjate normal nd taking the case where n +
themean of DTt, conditioned on observatiQns forDr1 and can be
shown (using the general formula for theconditional normal density from




(3/2)p21Di t - -
(A8)
+(p)[2DXLi. a -(3/8)p
Recall that p is the correlation between
u. (the T-innovation) and v. (the
X-innovation). a and a are the standard deviations foru and V., U V U ti
respectively.When p =0the coefficients in equation (A8) reduce to(1/4,
0). The coefficient ofDXtl has the same sign as p. The coefficient of
Dt1 is positive if p2 <2/3--thatis, if Jp <.82,Otherwise, the coef-
ficient is negative. The magnitude of thiscoefficient is no greater than
1/4--the value approaches -1/5 as jpj +1.p
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